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David Cohen* Of Persons and Property: 
Allan C. Hutchinson** The Politics of Legal Taxonomy 
"No theme is more basic. . . than the importan= of taxonomy viewed, not as a neutral hatrack 
for the objective facts of nature, but as a theory that constrains and directs our thmkmg . . . . 
Taxonomy is a dynamic and creative science of history." 
-Stephen Jay Go&*** 
I .  Introduction 
To talk of law without politics or history is nonsensical. All lawyers must 
concede that what they do takes place in historical circumstances and has 
political consequences. Every piece of law-making and law-application is 
a governmental act; it relies on political authority and claims binding 
force. Moreover, all legal activity occurs within a particular historical 
context; it is intended to respond to or influence a past, existing or 
anticipated state of affairs. This means that the study of law must concern 
itself with politics and history generally: it must not confine itself to only 
the politics and history of law. To do otherwise would be to distort and 
trivialise any understanding of law. Within such a broad political and 
historical appreciation, the focus of enquiry is not so much on 'law' as on 
'law-government' because the idea of law without government is almost 
oxymoronic.' Law is not only a symbol and act of power; it is also a 
major component of the social context in which those symbols and acts 
of power acquire meaning, significance and effect. 
As an instrument of political power and a constituent of historical 
consciousness, law and its study connect with some of the most profound 
issues on the sweeping agenda of intellectual research. To understand 
fully the operation of law, it is necessary to come to grips with turbulent 
questions of metaphysics, ethics, sociology and ideology. Any act or 
study of law, including this one, is grounded on assumptions about such 
matters and which inform the mundane round of legal practice. For 
instance, beliefs about the nature of individual identity, human 
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Vancouver. 
** Professor, Osgocde Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. 
*** S.J. Gould, TheFlamingo's Smile 243-44 (New York: Norton, 1985). 
1. K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradtion (Boston; Toronto: Little, Brown, 1960) at p. 
184. However, some have suggested that, in tribal communities, a non-positivistic law exists 
without a formal government order. See Hyde, The Gift Imagination and the Erotic Life of 
Proper& (New York: Random House, 1983). Of course, the converse is not true. There is a 
growing and rich tradition of political theory and practice that argues for 'government' without 
law. See G. Woodcock, Anarchism A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements. (New 
York: Meridian Book, 1962). 
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intentionality, social organisation and moral worth direct and anchor the 
criminal process. The fact that such operating premises are not evident to 
those who rely on them attests to their pervasiveness and potency. At its 
most blunt, understandings about the basic essence and value of 
humankind influence and contour debate about the historical function, 
political character and normative authority of law.2 Any attempt to 
separate the study of law from politics, history and theory is misguided 
and misleading. 
Although it is a matter of trite learning that law and lawyering are 
political, there remains the core belief that the interpretation and 
organization of law is, can, and should be performed in an apolitical 
manner. 'Formalism', both in rules and categories, continues to be the 
ruling theory of legal interpretation. Its central credo is that legal 
taxonomy and interpretation comprises the largely impersonal and 
determinate operation of practical rationality. While any faith in a crude 
reliance on some mechanical algorithm or logical parthogenesis has long 
since been abandoned, there is still a tenacious commitment and 
aspiration to bounded objectivity and revealed moral truths. While law 
is embedded in historical contexts and political circumstances, its 
organization and interpretation possesses an important, if not total, 
independence from them. As sophisticated formalists like Ronald 
Dworkin put it, "law.. . is deeply and thoroughly political . . ., @]ut not 
a matter of personal or partisan p~litics".~ 
In contrast to the received wisdom of formalism, we put forward an 
anti-formalist critique. We argue that the claimed dispositive power of 
formal rationality is, at best, illusory and, at worst, fraudulent; legal 
interpretation and legal taxonomy are more a matter of operational logic 
than logical operations. In almost every case, the ingenious judge is 
constrained only by the limits of her imagination. Legal doctrine 
represents a store of normative principles and argumentative techniques 
which are at her disposal to justify and rationalise her choices. 
Notwithstanding this, however, the judge is not a conscious manipulator 
of an independentlyexisting set of doctrinal materials or a willing party 
to some vast Machiavellian conspiracy. Legal doctrine is more than the 
residual traces of the unbounded free-play of the judicial mind. While 
judges live in history and society, they repay the compliment, or exact 
2. See H. Cantril, Human Nature and Political Systems. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1961). This insight or understanding is far from original. Thomas Hobbes' work rests 
upon a very particular and explicit idea of human nature. He argued that, in a state of nature, 
life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." It is a function of political society to provide 
people with a way of "getting themselves out from that miserable condition." See T. Hobbes, 
Leviathon (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968). 
3. R. Dworkin, A Mafter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Haward University Press, 1985). 
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their revenge, by living in judges. The posited separation between 'that to 
be organized and interpreted' (doctrine) and 'that which organizes and 
interprets' (judge) cannot be sustained. 
Whereas the formalist locates truth and authority almost exclusively in 
doctrine, the nihilist confers that logocentric privilege on the judge. Both 
theories ignore the historical dialectic at work between judge and 
doctrine; they are situated and shaped by their political milieu, constantly 
interacting and interpenetrating. Each is implicated by and in the other.4 
Far from loosening the political bite of the critique of formalism, this 
approach sharpens and deepens it: the nihilist is only one kind of anti- 
formalist and a misguided one at that. By treating legal categorization and 
interpretation as distinct forms of social activity, a sophisticated theory of 
anti-formalism better explains the felt necessities of doctrinal constraints 
on interpretive freedom. Further, by locating these constraints within 
contingent socio-historical contexts, it exposes their counterfeit claims to 
necessity, reveals their political determinants and explains their historical 
fungibility. 
The essay falls into three major parts. In the first part, we explain and 
describe what we believe to be the core idea of law - that it represents 
a discursive and taxonomic economy which is used to give meaning to 
the world by creating a particular and partial reality. The concepts and 
language lawyers use, the way those media are deployed, the 
argumentative devices relied upon, and the values inculcated combine in 
conscious and unconscious ways to constitute law and a legal style of life. 
In part two, we tell two stories. One involves the Supreme Court's 
treatment of a young girl whose life was tragically altered after she 
participated in a public immunization program; the other involves the 
Court's treatment of a mining entrepreneur whose property had been 
devalued after he participated in a public parks program. The two stories 
represent a stark and compelling example of the power of ideas and the 
politics of taxonomy. In the third and final part, we explore alternative 
ways of telling these stories and make tentative suggestions for a more 
egalitarian vision of law and its intellectual foundations. 
11. hkoners of the White Lines on the Freeway 
1 .  Other Worlds, Classical Music and Heavy Metal 
The world is not given to us. While there is some 'there' out there, there 
is no particular 'there' there until we put it there. To live in a world, that 
world must first be made. The world is not a hidden chest of existential 
4. See Kennedy, "Toward a Phenomenology of Judging" in The Rule of Law: Z&al or 
Ideology. (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), (A. Hutchinson and F! Monahan eds.). 
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treasures, waiting to be unearthed and exhibited in some vast National 
Institute of Canadian Archaeology in Ottawa. Any treasure found will, in 
an important sense, have been placed there; it can only be re-created or 
re-activated. The world is a coral reef of the mind; living metaphors that 
have crystalliSed and been forgotten, later to be (re)discovered as 
independent and 'real'. We only find the world we make and, in 
(re)making it, we often find new worlds.5 These are not different worlds 
or alternatives to 'reality', but are new and different realities. The worlds 
of our historical ancestors and our cultural relations are not our's. The 
footprint we find on the future and past shores of the unknown is and will 
be our own. 
It is tempting to suggest that, through the use of fictive powers and 
taxonomic techniques, order is made out of chaos. But the very notion 
and sense of 'chaos' is itself a construction; it is not a given. Order and 
chaos are only intelligible in terms of the other; the one relies on the other 
by its selfdefining exclusion of it. Order's critical bite and meaning arise 
from being set against some preexisting understanding of chaos and vice- 
versa: "And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? / 
Those people were a kind of solution."6 A better way of grasping the 
nature of world-making is to think of a vast infiniteness. There are not 
discrete objects with clear boundaries, but an irreducible continuum with 
fuzzy and imposed demarcations. Taxonomy and its intrinsic order have 
a history and, therefore, a politics. 
In order to exist in a tolerable way, it is necessary for people to reduce 
the world to human proportions, finite dimensions and historical 
specificity. The world must become familiar and manageable, if it is to be 
less threatening to a continuing sense of existential well-being. By the act 
of classifying and categorising, a particular reality is created and 
internalised. In constituting that world, it will be given an appropriate 
externality and ontological  tatu us.^ Yet, in the essential and creative act of 
world-making, people also must engage in the equally unavoidable act of 
worldending. To make one world is to abandon, at least temporarily, 
other potential worlds. Sight and blindness are simultaneously 
experienced. A way of seeing is always a way of not seeing: 
5. For a slightly different development of these themes, see A. Hutchinson, Dwelling on the 
Threshou Cdzkall3says on Modern Legal Thought. (Toronto: Carswell, 1988). 
6. C. Cavafy, "Expecting The Barbarians" in The Complete Poem. of Cavah. ((London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1961) at pp. 18-19. 
7. See J. Bruner, Actual Minds; Possible Worltir Cambridge. (Mass.: University Press, 1986). 
W. Quine, Ontological Real@ and Other Essays ( 1  969); N .  Goodman, Ways of Worhhking. 
(Indianapolis. Hackett Pub. Co., 1978). 
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If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man 
as it is, infinite. 
For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro' narrow chinks 
of his cavern? 
A high price is exacted for world-making. In order to live, 
generalisation and selectivity must occur. Yet, in so doing, it will be the 
case that people will necessarily distort, trivialize and overlook: if 
something is not excluded, there will be everything and, therefore, 
nothing. We often inhabit more than one world in and through time. 
Moreover, these conceptual caverns are built from the bricks of 
categorization and the cement of exclusion. In this way, caverns become 
both shelters and prisons. They act as welcome havens from the 
bewildering storms that buffet people throughout history. But, at the 
same time, they are dungeons whose walls mark off the limits of a 
particular world. At best, glimpses of other possible worlds can only be 
glimpsed through the bars of the existing cell-windows. These Blakean 
caverns ensure the possibility and parameters of any world: security cuts 
both ways. The felt incapacity to imagine different forms of social life to 
the present has less to do with the limits of 'reality' than with the limits 
of the extant world. The difficulty of learning is negligible as compared 
to the almost Sisyphean task of unlearning. 
Some examples will serve to concretise these abstract claims - one 
visual, another aural and a third normative. For many, the world of 
colours seems to be a perfectly natural occurrence in which the different 
shades and hues of the spectrum are experienced universally. Yet there is 
more to seeing than ordinarily meets the eye. While all normal-sighted 
people experience similar stimuli and make sense of the continuum of 
electromagnetic radiation by dividing the range of wavelengths into 
names of colours, some language groups have different schemes by which 
they effect this process. For instance, English speakers 'see' the colour 
grey between blue and brown, while the Welsh have no separate 
designation for grey and identify it as either g h  (blue) or llwyd (brown). 
Moreover, gh, like the Latin glaucus, runs over into the English grey 
and green? It can be grasped how the naturally-experienced world of 
colour is based upon a scheme of differences that is embedded in the 
conventional language of a social group. As such, the English and the 
8. William Blake, "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell" in Blake: Complete Wrirings of William 
Blake. (New York: Random House, 1966) at p. 164. The sexism of this quote is not lost on 
us. See infa 
9. See L. Hjelmslev, A Prolegomena to a Theory of Language 53 (F. J .  Whitfield trans. 1969) 
and C. Belsey, Critical Practice. ((London: Methuen, 1980) at pp. 40-42. 
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Welsh inhabit slightly different worlds and experience slightly different 
realities. 
On a more familiar and personal scale, people often cringe at the 
strangeness of hearing their own 'different' voices played back on a tape 
recording or of catching a glimpse of their own 'different' image in a 
mirror. What we believe is not what we perceive and what we perceive 
is not what we sense. We hear with more than our ears and see with more 
than our eyes. Not only does interpretation begin where perception ends, 
but interpretation is a profoundly political act.10 When we 'listen to the 
music' much more happens than the passive physical connection between 
air molecules and tympanic membranes. To 'listen to the music' involves 
a whole apparatus of mental images, intellectual habits, social 
assumptions, emotional sets, political affiliations and imaginary 
constructs. And, so we do not 'miss' the sound, there has to be a wilful 
act of attention. As Walt Whitman put it: 
All music is what awakens from you when you are reminded by the 
instruments. 
It is not the violins and the comets . . . nor the notes of the baritone 
singer.. . 
It is nearer and farther than they." 
While there may be a similarity of stimuli, there is a very different 
reception experienced by different listeners. The classical music buff does 
not listen and hear in the same way as the heavy metal fan. The favoured 
music of each not only sounds different to the other, but is different. The 
sound of music is in the mind and heart of the beholder as well as her or 
his ear; sound needs to be placed in an interpretive context before it 
becomes music. The world of the Beethoven devotee is not the world of 
the Bon Jovi fan. Facts, sights and sounds are shaped as much by internal 
considerations as by external signals. Perception is never unaffected by 
perspective and experience is always conditioned by the assumptions 
with which it is approached. 
A third example takes the point a little further and hopefully begins to 
support some of our larger claims. In describing the world around us and 
the things that comprise it, there is a marked tendency to speak in terms 
that are taken to be value-neutral and that are thought to order, represent 
or label a pre-given physical world. Allowing for the dissonances 
between different language groups, it is assumed that there is a fixed 
10. T. Kuhn, The Smcture of Scienlific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1970) at p . 198. 
11. W. Whitman, "A Song for Occupations" from Leaves of Grass (1955) in Walt Whihnan, 
Complete Peotry and Collected Prose. (New York, N.Y.: Literary Classics of the United States; 
distributed by Viking Press, 1982), at p. 94. 
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reality out there that is separate from our own attempt to give meaning 
to it. Surely there are 'trees' that are naturally separate from the flowers 
and shrubs surrounding them? Unfortunately (or fortunately), the answer 
is far from obvious or uncontroversial. While there is a whole mass of 
somethings out there, they do not reveal themselves as particular 
somethings without our prompting or connivance. 
'Tree' does not possess a positive presence by virtue of having an 
independent treeness within it. Its distinctiveness and meaning are the 
product of a socially-created and historically-acquired scheme of 
taxonomic ordering. The language in which 'tree' functions endows 
certain attributes, such as leaves and bark, with a significance in the 
meaning-giving enterprise. Within another system of sigdication, a very 
different set of identlfylng attributes might be considered significant and 
meaningful. For instance, categorisation might depend on (a) whether it 
can talk; (b) aesthetic appeal; (c) how much it weighed; (d) whether it 
can be eaten; (e) et c e t e r ~  (0 how big is it from the distance; (g) the 
extent of its mathematical possibilities; (h) how much it is worth.12 
Accordingly, a thing's identity and meaning is never simply found or 
observed, but is always imposed and located within a particular 
taxonomic structure. It is less a matter of technical refinement and more 
a case of creative designation. There is no form of pure taxonomy or 
communication that passively represents instead of actively producing. 
The world is within the language and the language within the world. The 
world cannot speak for itself; it must be spoken for. Language is a form 
of social action and the raw material from which different worlds are 
forged. It is a cultural artifact of the first order: 
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The 
categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do 
not find there . . . on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscope 
flux of impressions which has to be organised by our minds - and this 
means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, 
organise it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely 
because we are parties to an agreement to organise it in this way . . . . The 
agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one, but itcs t e r n  are 
absohtely obligatory; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the 
organisation and classification of data which the agreement decrees. [N]o 
individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is 
constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself 
most free.13 
12. These ideas are borrowed in a slightly adapted form from Peller, "The Metaphysics of 
American Law" (1985), 73 CaL L Rev. 1151 at 1162-70 and N. Evemden, The NancralAliem 
Humankind and Environment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at pp. 98-99. 
13. B. L. Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings, (John B. Carroll ed.). 
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With the establishment of quantum mechanics, the scientific 
community has abandoned the view that the physical world is simply 
'out there' waiting for us to notice it in all its plenitude: "no elementary 
phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon."14 
Time has well passed when it should be recognised that this insight is 
doubly true for the social world. Under such a perspective, reality 
becomes largely a conventional construct and matter of profound habit. 
Of course, we are not free to construct any world at all for the constraints 
of our own vulnerability and frailty and the scarcity of different resources 
foreclose certain options. But, although any world in which people live is 
not objective (in the sense of having a truth value and universal status that 
transcends the commitments and interests of its inhabitants), it is not 
subjective either (in the sense that each individual is free to sanction or 
abandon it as she or he chooses). If the world is not a mirror of our 
aspirations, it is not not a mirror either. The world is a communal 
property; it belongs to particular people at particular moments in history. 
There is no absolute Truth about ourselves and the world. Nor is truth 
given over to the private molding of any individual. Knowledge is 
ingrained in social life and reinforced in social practice. 
In order to understand or make a better world, the task is not to amass 
more information; facts are never independent of the theory in which 
they achieve their status as facts. What is required is a more appropriate 
metaphor and intellectual structure for living. In this way, classification is 
a fundamental human activity: "to exist, humanely, is to name the 
world."ls The worth of any scheme of conceptual ordering is not 
determined by its degree of fit with a pre-given world nor in terms of 
whether it is natural or artificial. Any taxonomic ordering is to be judged 
by its capacity to be more or less helpful in making the best of our 
personal and collective lives. As such, the art and science of taxonomy - 
for the difference is more a question of style than substance16 - involves 
and can never escape the responsibility to take and defend a moral stance. 
Categorisation has, therefore, its own history and politics because the 
privilege of naming also carries with it the power to control. Taxonomy 
(Cambridge: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956) at pp. 213-214. 
Tlte language of 'dissect' and 'cut up' itself is a very partial way of speaking about the world 
and, therefore, of relating to that world. 
14. J. Wheeler, "Frontiers of Time" in Problems in the Foun&tions of Physics. (Amsterdam; 
New York: North Holland Pub. Co., 1979) at p. 198. (Toroldo & Francia eds.). See also, Tribe, 
"The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From Modem Physics" 
(1989), 103 H m .  L Rev. 1. 
15. P. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: The Seabury Press, 1970) at p. 76. 
16. See T. Kuhn, The Essential Tension. Selected Stua'ies in Scienfljic Tradition and Change. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977) at p. 343. 
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is a major site for the political struggle over the kind of world we want 
to live in and classification is the historical manifestation of a contingent 
association between interest and perspective. The point of view that 
prevails will, at least temporarily, shape and give direction to people's 
lives, benefiting some and disadvantaging others. There is no neutral or 
uncommitted place on which to stand and name. And there is no neutral 
and uncommitted description of the world. The white lines on life's 
freeway that guide society into the future are projections of deep-seated 
values and silent aspirations. While the taxonomic map is not the social 
territory, it is a crucial part of that existential terrain and must be 
appreciated as such. 
2. The Language of Law 
Language is much more than words and there are many different 
languages that we all speak. Language not only consists of a specialised 
vocabulary, but a repertoire of argumentative devices and rhetorical 
strategies for its deployment; it contains and is comprehended in an 
implicit taxonomy of ordering concepts. These discursive practices, 
procedures and policies allow people to perceive, understand, act, 
criticise, change and disagree in a mutually intelligible manner. By 
simultaneously empowering certain modes of action and foreclosing 
others, language manages to hold people in a grip that is more powerful 
than mere force of arms.17 Also, there are many languages at work in our 
society or, perhaps more accurately, there are many dialects within a 
society's language. The dialect of the lawyer is different to that of the 
layperson. But the difference is much more significant than their different 
idioms and accents. Through their different languages, they inhabit 
different worlds; their understanding of the world and their normative 
response to it are substantially at odds. Neither is more 'right' or 'wrong' 
than the other in absolute terms. However, lawyers are tempted by 
professional inclination and social acquiescence to claim an authoritative 
status for their language that overwhelms or trivializes other's; lawyers 
treat their language as the only language or, at least, the language of 
languages. 
Legal discourse is a particularly potent tool for negotiating and 
constructing social reality. It is one of the ways society defines itself and 
presents the world to itself. While the state often relies on crude force or 
threats to achieve its ends, the law's strength and long-term viability stems 
from its success as a sophisticated mode of ideology. The discursive 
17. See Hutchinson, A., "Part of An Essay on Power and Interpretation" (1985), 60 h!YU.L 
Rev. 850 at 875-78. 
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practices that comprise the language of the law structure the world in 
particular and partial ways. Being normative in nature, it operates as a 
gatekeeper of the mind which all factual entrants must not only respect 
and obey, but which designates them as valid facts in the lirst place. As 
an intelligible description of and mutual prescription for action, legal 
discourse pre-disposes its speakers and listeners to certain interpretive 
choices and social stances. Located and sustained by historical conditions 
and circumstances, the discourse is socially imposed and, what is often 
overlooked, unconsciously assumed by its individual users. Indeed, its 
efficacy is attributable to its achievement of an ostensibly robust, 
plausibly coherent and functionally dependable image of social life and 
control. 
More than most languages and taxonomic structures, law has managed 
to suppress the contingent character of social history. By institutionalizing 
an entrenched set of social values, legal discourse and classification has 
succeeded, at least partially, to contain the dynamism of history-making 
and, in the process, has persuaded people of the 'naturalness' and 
'necessity' of current legal constructs which transform as they represent 
social arrangements. However, while the intellectual categories and 
rhetorical tropes of legal discourse do provide a minimally operative 
image of the world, it is so fragile and shallow that it can offer no real 
conceptual comfort or repose from the continuing history of political 
struggle: "law is a reiterated failure to classify life."18 Its prime function 
is to paper over the endemic cracks and contradictions of contemporary 
life. Consequently, its authority and appeal as a privileged and heeded 
voice of society is illusory. The taxonomic categories of the law are 
neither determinate nor dispositive. Although they do not sanction and 
produce a detailed set of social prescriptions and consequences, they do 
stake out the venue, weapons and strategies for political struggle. As such, 
law is a formidable obstacle to any real social change; the way people 
think about themselves and their limitations is an integral component of 
any engaged attempt to change the world. 
111. A Tale of Two Cases 
1 .  The Legal Wager 
As language-users, people are unwitting gamblers in life. They make a 
critical wager: in return for the privilege of living in any world, they are 
committed to living in one particular world. The nature of that world will 
depend on the language spoken for each language consists of a whole 
18. Milsom, "A Pageant in Modem Dress" (1975), 84 Yale LJ. 1585. 
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package of foundational beliefs and assumptions about reality and the 
individual's place within it. Linguistic concepts are not terms through 
which to view and describe an independent reality, but actually constitute 
that reality. By using a language, its unspoken values and commitments 
are heard and accepted. As Umberto Eco puts it, "the subject is spoken 
by lang~age."~9 Under the hard shell of language, there is a soft 
ideological underbelly. It is not a dessicated husk, but a throbbing and 
powerful kernel of life: 
For with names the world was called 
Out of the empty air, 
With names was built and walled, 
Line and circle and square, 
Dust and emerald, 
Snatched from deceiving death, 
By the articulate breath.20 
The staple feature of modern legal language is right~-talk.~' The law 
insists on characterizing and categorizing social interaction as occasions 
for the exercise or breach of legal rights. When individuals charge 
another "You have breached the contract", they have forced their 
dealings into a particular linguistic and, therefore, ideological strait- 
jacket: they have entered the world of contractual rights and obligations. 
By speaking in that way, they have adopted a very partial idiom and have 
set aside other ways of describing their shared experience. For example, 
the sterile and impersonal style of rights ignores the understanding of the 
event as an immediate inter-personal act of shared trust and commitment 
or as an honourable undertaking. They have given abstract rights-talk an 
objective existence, treated it as a thing to be grasped and wielded. 
Moreover, they have brought into play a whole paraphernalia of 
expectations about their future dealings together. In effect, they have had 
created for them a distinct past and future scenario for their experience. 
Discourse has worked a practical and significant exercise of power. By 
filtering it through the sieve of abstract rights-talk, a rich and complex 
experience has been diluted and sanitized. 
Rationalised by academic scholarship and reinforced by legal 
educati0n,2~ the law divides social activity into a variety of doctrinal 
19. U. Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of hnguage. (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1984) at p. 45. 
20. E. Muir, Animak. Collected Poems 1921-58 (London; Faber and Faber, 1960). 
21. See Hutchinson and Monahan, "The 'Rights' Stuff: Roberto Unger and Beyond" (1984), 
62 Texas L Rev. 1477 at 1479-91. 
22. This structuring begins even before law school starts. Although they might not appreciate 
its import, readers of law school brochures are informed that law divides the world into 
property, torts, contract, etc. 
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categories and develops different principles to understand and evaluate 
that categorised activity. Although borne of historical expediency, these 
categories are permitted to take on a life of their own and, like 
Frankenstein's monster, begin to control as much as be controlled by 
their creators. Unlike 'scientific' behaviour, social activity responds to 
these conceptual characterisations and begins to reorganise and 
reproduce itself in accordance with its informing taxonomic structure. 
This gives the process a degree of self-fulfilling coherence and plausibility. 
But this apparent rationality is only paper-thin and, when push comes to 
shove, the whole doctrinal edifice starts to collapse under the weight of 
its contradictions.23 
This fragility is especially evident along the edges of the different 
doctrinal categories; taxonomic borders are fuzzy and places of 
intellectual danger. These difficulties are not confined to these penumbral 
regions, but pervade legal discourse and become egregious at the 
doctrinal limits. A topical example is the interaction between 'contract' 
and 'tort', in particular the rules governing liability for the negligent 
infliction of economic loss where there is no physical injury or property 
damage. In short, should Mrs. Donoghue be able to recover the 
diminished value of the offending ginger-beer bottle? Anglo-Canadian 
courts seem to have gone every which way on this question.24 The main 
contending argument is that there is no principled distinction between 
economic loss consequent on physical damage and that which is not. 
However, to allow recovery for such loss would be to place a plaintiff in 
as good or better position than those who have a contract with the 
defendant. Such claims bring into question the whole doctrinal basis for 
distinguishing between contractual and tortious liability and reveal a 
distinction that even traditional critics consider invidious, arbitrary and 
23. For an extended account of this critique, see Hutchinson, "The Rise and Ruse of 
Administrative Law and Scholarship" (1985), 48 Modem L. Rev. 198 and "Mice Under a 
Chair: Democracy, Courts and the Administrative State" (1989), 41 U. Tor. L.J. (forthcoming) 
24. See Cohen, "Bleeding Hearts and Peeling Floors: Compensation for Economic Loss at the 
House of Lords" (1984), 18 U.B.C. L. Rev. 289. An economic loss case which dramatically 
illustrates the collapse of contract and tort categories is B.D.C. Ltd v. Hofstrand Farm Limited 
andh. in the Right of BritLFh Columbia, [I9861 3 W.W.R. 216 (S.C.C.). In the future, it can 
only be hoped that the Supreme Court will be able to recognize the artificiality of the legal 
world they have created in talking about the tort/contract conflict presented in the economic 
loss cases. Recent decisions in England indicate that the judges there have retreated from the 
expansive approach which some have interpreted them to be taking. See Tate & Lyle Food 
D&ribution v. Greater London Council [I9831 2 A.C. 509 (H.L.); Candlewood Navigation 
Corporation Ltd v. Mitsui OSK Lines, [I9851 2 All ER 935, [I9851 3 WLR 381 (PC); 
Muirhead v. Industrial Tank at Specialities Ltd and Others, [I9851 3 All ER 705, [I9851 3 
WLR 993 (CA). 
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illogical.25 In a rare moment of candid criticism, -Lord Roskill brings to 
light, intentionally or otherwise, the deeper jurisprudential issue: 
I think today the proper control lies not in asking whether the proper 
remedy should lie in contract or . . . tort, not in somewhat capricious 
judicial determination whether a particular case falls on one side of the 
line or the other, not in somewhat artificial distinctions between physical 
and economic or financial loss when the two sometimes go together and 
sometimes do not . . ., but in the first instance in establishing the relevant 
principles and then in deciding whether the particular case falls within or 
without those principles.26 
Even the partial enlightenment of Lord Roskill is sadly lacking at the 
Supreme Court of Canada; its absence is voluble. If recent events are 
harbingers of the future, law in Canada is likely to remain as outmoded 
as its formal trappings. 
At the heart of the legal enterprise is a taxonomic structure that does 
not simply offer the lawyer a way to organise and look at the world, but 
brings into existence a world and a way of experiencing that world. It is 
all the more powerful in its effects and infiltration because of its ability to 
persuade its holders of its status as a natural representation, not a 
dynamic creation, of an existing world. Through training and interest, the 
taxonomy of law has become first-nature to most lawyers. This renders 
it almost invisible to them and, therefore, largely immune from critical 
appraisal. Accordingly, the task of this article is to bring that taxonomy 
to visible attention and put it under critical scrutiny. The ambition is to 
demonstrate the politics of the taxonomic structure at work in one 
particular region of the law and to suggest ways to revise it in line with 
more helpful visions of the good life - to paint some fresh white lines 
and to direct the freeway along a different route. 
2. A Man of Property 
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada illustrate the 
importance and force of the legal taxonomy which installs law's world 
and structures the resolution of disputes within it. On April 4, 1985, the 
Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal in Lapierre v. Attorney- 
General of Quebe~;~' Nathalie Lapierre had sought compensation for 
25. See A. M. Tettenborn, An Introduction to the Law of Obligations. (London; Toronto: 
Butterworths, 1984). 
26. Junior Books Ltd v. Veitchi Co. Ltd, [I9831 1 A.C. 520 at 545 (HL). These words, of 
course, offer only a very illusory critique, for Lord Roskill implies the existence of some level 
of fixed and fixable principles that can be resorted to to resolve the dispute. Like Ronald 
Dworkin, he only 'solves' the problem by hiding it at a higher level of abstraction; see 
Dworkin, R., Law's Empire. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1986). 
27. (1985), 16 D.L.R. (4th) 554, (S.C.C.) dismissing an appeal from the Quebec Court of 
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personal injuries which she had suffered as a result of a publically funded 
vaccination program organized by the Quebec government. Thirty-five 
days later, on May 9, 1985, the Supreme Court upheld a claim for 
compensation in The Queen in Right of British Columbia v. Tener et al-28 
David Tener had claimed compensation for economic losses incurred as 
a result of the implementation of a provincial parks program by the 
British Columbia government. Whereas Lapierre was perceived to be a 
'torts' case, Tener was perceived to be a 'property' case. Those taxonomic 
intuitions and perceptions - the way the questions were asked and the 
issues framed - to a large extent determined the outcomes in each case. 
There were four possible outcomes to Tener and Lapierre: both could 
have won; both could have lost; Nathalie could have won and Tener 
could have lost; and Nathalie could have lost and Tener could have won. 
While there is no uncontroversial ordering of these outcomes that would 
garner unanimous approval, it would seem that, outside of the world of 
legal doctrine, most people would consider the fourth outcome to be the 
most horrific. Few would be prepared to argue ab initio that Tener's 
property is more deserving of protection and compensation than 
Nathalie's life. Indeed, notwithstanding the judgments, most people 
would more than likely subscribe to the opposite view. But this fourth 
outcome is exactly what prevailed in Tener and Lapierre. 
Although the values that motivated and informed the decisions are 
obvious enough, it will be necessary to explain later the values which 
underlie the decisions. But what is initially remarkable, however, is that 
neither Mr. Justice Chouinard in Lapierre nor Mr. Justice Estey in Tener 
had an inkling that the cases raised much the same issues and problems. 
Neither judgment refers to the other. Neither judgment alludes to the 
need for a common underlying justification for state action and 
accountability in the cases. And neither judgment recognizes openly that 
the central conundnun in the cases is the extent of social responsibility for 
the welfare of others. Of course, it would be naive and disingenuous to 
maintain there is a judicial conspiracy of silence at work; nothing suggests 
that there was a studied ignorance of the normative similarities nor that 
an overt manipulation of doctrinal structures and arguments to achieve 
desired outcomes occurred. Nonetheless, the contiguity of Lapierre and 
Tener is a stark example of the tenacity and force of taxonomic 
structures, their hidden values and their insidious operation. 
Appeal, 7 D.L.R. (4th) 37,27 C.C.L.T. 190, which had allowed an appeal from the Quebec 
Superior Court, [I9791 Quebec S.C. 907,13 C.C.L.T. 1. 
28. (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 1, (S.C.C.) dismissing an appeal from the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal, 133 D.L.R. (3d) 168, [I9821 3 W.W.R. 214, which had allowed an appeal from the 
British Columbia Supreme Court, 114 D.L.R. (3d) 728. 
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In 1973, as Mr. Justice Lambert put it, "mining in parks was a difficult 
political issue".29 On April 18, 1973 Royal Assent was given to an 
amendment to the Mineral Act, which required any individual exploring 
for or producing minerals in a British Columbia provincial park to 
receive prior Cabinet a~thorization.3~ On the same day, Royal Assent 
was given to an amendment to the Park Act. This Act reclassified Wells 
Gray Park as a Class A park and preserved its natural resources until a 
park use permit was issued by the government. Furthermore, no permit 
could be issued unless it was "necessary to the preservation or 
maintenance of the recreational values of the park".3l David Tener had 
invested considerable sums in the preliminary development of certain 
mineral resources which he and others owned in the park. From 1973 
until 1977, he engaged in several unsuccessful attempts to obtain the 
necessary government authorizations to mine and exploit the area. 
Finally, frustrated with five years of what he considered to be 
bureaucratic obduracy, he sued the British Columbia government. He 
claimed compensation for the capital value of the mineral resources, his 
wasted expenditures and his anticipated profits from the exploitation of 
the mining claims. 
The basis of Tener's claim was that the Province had expropriated his 
property and that compensation was payable under the applicable 
provincial legi~lation.3~ Alternatively, he argued that his property was 
injuriously affected by the creation of the park and that compensation 
was payable under the Land Clauses Act. At trial, Mr. Justice Rae held 
that the claim for injurious affection failed since the provincial legislation 
applicable in expropriation cases constituted a "complete code" of 
compensatory entitlements. He maintained that the denial of a permit did 
not constitute an expropriation of property since Tener continued to own 
the mineral resources; that their economic value had been reduced 
considerably was irrelevant. In the British Columbia Court of Appeal, 
Mr. Justice Larnbert agreed, if for different reasons, that no expropriation 
had taken place. Nonetheless, he awarded compensation to Tener for 
injurious affection under the Land Clauses Act. 33He interpreted the Park 
Act and the Minirtiy of Highways and Public Works Act as permitting the 
29. 133 D.L.R. (34  168 at 173. 
30. An Act to Amend the Mineral Act S.B.C. 1973, c.52,s.g. 
31. An Act Amend the Park Act, S.B.C. 1973, c.67, s.3. 
32. Park Act, S.B.C. 1965, as amended 1977, c.75, and The Minktry of Highways andPublic 
Works Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c.109, s.15 (as amended), now The Minktry of Transportation and 
HighwayAct, R.S.B.C. 1970, c.280. 
33. Mr. Justice Lambert focussed on his perception that the Crown did not acquire rights in 
or to property, and thus that there had been no 'taking'. Supra, note 27 at 133 D.L.R. (3d) 168 
at 180 (B.C.C.A.). 
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operation of the Land Clauses A d  where injurious affection, in the 
absence of expropriation, had occurred. While he justified his conclusion 
through several arguments, he placed emphasis on the principle that 
compensatory claims should be resolved in favour of the claimant when 
a person's property had been "injuriously affected by an enterprise 
camed out by the Crown for the benefit of the public"." Finally, he held, 
in a remarkably revisionist exercise of case analysis, that the denial of a 
permit could constitute injurious affection notwithstanding that there was 
no physical invasion of the land itself, no physical obstruction of access 
and no unlawful act rendered lawful by statutory powers.35 
At the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Justice Estey delivered the 
majority judgment. He supported Tener's proposition that a property 
right included a right to minerals as well as a right of access necessary for 
their development. The focus and definition of the property right allowed 
him to invoke a remarkable nineteenth century interpretive fiction that "a 
statute is not to be construed so as to take away the property of a subject 
without compensation"; this is based on the political belief that 
deprivation of property rights associated with state action should be 
shared by the community.36 He also held, as he was forced to by the logic 
of the 'property structure', that the denial of access to the mineral 
resources constituted a recovery of part of the rights granted by the 
Crown in 1937 and that a "taking" occurred because the value of a state 
asset - the park - was enhanced. Madam Justice Wilson followed a 
similar course of argument and insisted that "the vice aimed at is 
expropriation without compensation".37 In her view, the denial of the 
access permit deprived Tener of his profit a prendre and constituted a 
taking since the deprivation effectively resulted in the Crown removing 
an encumbrance from its own property. In short, Tener's loss was the 
Crown's gain. With a tragic sense of irony, she stated that "it would, in 
my view, be quite unconscionable to say that this cannot constitute an 
expropriation in some technical, legalistic sense".38 
While the conflict between Tener and the state could have been 
interpreted as a story about what we wish to do and what we can do 
34. 133 D.L.R. (3d) 168 at 178. 
35. See Todd, "The Mystique of Injurious Affection in the Law of Expropriation" (1967), 
U.B.C.L. Rev. 127. 
36. Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd, [I9201 A.C. 508 at 542. (H.L.(E.)) 
37. (1985) 17 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 23. (S.C.C.) We do not know what Wilson J. meant by 'vice', 
but the Shorter Oxford Enghsh Dictionary defines it as a "habit or a practice of an immoral, 
degrading or wicked nature," or "a moral fault or defect (without implication of serious wrong- 
doing)". 
38. (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 25. (S.C.C.) 
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when one person's welfare has been diminished as a result of government 
action to benefit the community, that is not the way the judgments read. 
The formalistic and analytical framework applied to the reality 
constructed by the judges transforms that idea (if it ever existed in the 
minds of the judges) into a claim for compensation on an expropriation 
of property. Attention is thus focused on historical legal concepts of 
property, on the formal requirements of a taking, and the interpretation 
of common law and statutory rights of compensation which 'exist'. In an 
important sense, all of the judgments operate at this level. Given the pre- 
understanding of the judges and the internalized structure of law, the 
judicial exercise is to define property, establish its taking and interpret the 
relevant legislation and common law cases to provide a right to 
compensation. The result is presented as flowing inexorably from the 
initial perception of Tener's welfare as a property right. 
3. A Child of Tort 
The courts' initial perception of Lapierre was radically different. If Tener 
was a 'property' case, Lapierre was a 'torts' case. On September 14, 
1972, Nathalie Lapierre, then five years old, received an inoculation of a 
measles vaccine as part of a mass inoculation program which the 
Province of Quebec had organized. Within a week, Nathalie began 
exhibiting symptoms consistent with acute viral hepatitis. She was 
admitted to hospital and consequently the illness had "entrainer son 
incapacite permanente quasi t ~ t a l e " . ~ ~  Her father sued the Quebec 
government so that Nathalie might be able to receive special educational 
and social care for the rest of her 'life'. The Lapierres were successful at 
trial and were awarded $375,000. 
Lapierre would likely be classified as a 'tort' case in common law 
provinces.40 In Quebec, the case was argued within the context of two 
39. (1980) 13 C.C.L.T. 1 at 8 (Quebec Superior Court). 
40. The categorization would probably have resulted in the dismissal of the law suit for several 
reasons. First, judicial attitudes towards strict products liability and design defects suggest that 
the judges would have demanded a demonstration of governmental negligence as a pre- 
condition of liability. Second, the decision to implement a mass innoculation program with 
concomitant risks of personal injury would almost certainly have been labelled a 'policy' 
decision and thus beyond judicial review. Finally, the provincial crown proceedings legislation 
almost uniformly predicate vicarious state liability on the demonstration of a common law tort 
committed by a particular civil servant. Of course, we recognize that potential tort liability can 
be articulated using common law concepts. See Reyes v. Wyeth Luboratories, 498 E2d 1264 
(1974), (United States C,A,); Peffy v. United Stutes, 740 F.2d 1428 (1984). In Peny, the 
plaintiff recovered compeniation under the Swine Flu Act, 28 U.S.C.A. ss.l346(b), 
2671-2680, under which the United States was derivatively Liable for the drug manufacturer's 
liability as well as directly liable for its own negligence. 
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sections of the Code Civil. Article 1053 imposes liability in the event of 
fauk and Article 1057 imposes liability when the defendant's act is 
motivated by an (un)fortuitous event, namely a measles epidemic!' 
Article 1057 is admittedly drafted in language capable of a range of 
interpretations. It had been used in earlier cases to indemnify individuals 
whose property had been damaged by government acting to benefit the 
community. At trial, Mr. Justice Nadeau held that Article 1057 could be 
applied where a fortuitous event (a measles epidemic) resulted in a 
deliberate act by the government (the establishment of a mass inoculation 
program), even if implemented after an accurate risk/benefit analysis. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the government's a~peal.4~ It chose to 
interpret Article 1057 to apply only to obligations imposed independ- 
ently under other Code or statutory provisions. In the absence of a 
specific immunization liability section, Article 1057 could not be used to 
impose liability. The formal analysis reflected in statements that "the 
courts can only apply law as it existsW43 apparently overwhelmed 
sentiments that compensation would have been a better result. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada was given by Mr. 
Justice Chouinard. Affirming the Court of Appeal decision, he expressed 
his sympathy for Nathalie, but little else. In legal terms, his judgment is 
long on authority, but short on analysis. First, he distinguished on formal 
grounds cases like Quebec v. Mahonej44 Dalbec v. Montreal45 and 
Guardian Insurance Co, v. Chicoutimi46 in which compensation was 
awarded when private homes were damaged or property revenues were 
diminished by state action. He characterized them as instances of 'tacit' 
expropriation; Lapierre was seemingly not amenable to such 
characterization. Second, he refused to develop a general theory of equal 
41. We r- that Canadian law is characterized by two primary ideas - civil law and 
common law. The structure of law in each province thus compels very different intellectual 
exercises before we even begin to understand the Lapieme and Tener cases. Nevertheless, the 
civil structure of Quebec law and the common structure of British Columbia law do not 
determine the outcome of these cases. First, the trial judge in Lnpierre, working within the 
structure of the Code Civil, could and did provide compensation to Nathalie. French judges in 
the early 1960s did the same in France. Second, the civilian stmture is not monolithic and 
different judges internalize it to different extents. Common law language and thought, as 
exhibited in Tener, is also not determinative. Again, in Tener, the trial judge could and did 
deny compensation. As well, Tener reflects the interpretation of ambiguously worded 
collections of statutes - and it is fair to say, as the Supreme Court of Canada did, that the 
internalized structure of private property and ideas about the appropriate role of the state and 
community were far more important than "technical, legalistic" arguments. See supra, note 42. 
42. (1984), 7 D.L.R. (4th) 37. 
43. Id, at 46. 
44. (1901), 10 C.B.R. 378 (K.B.). 
45. (1902), 22 C.S. 23 (Superior Court). 
46. (1915), 51 S.C.R. 562,25 D.L.R. 322. 
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contribution, extrapolated from the Code's theory of general average 
contrib~tion.~~ In addition, Chouinard J. refused to construct a theory of 
compensation from Article 407 which provides that "No one can be 
compelled to give up his property, except for public utility, and in 
consideration of a just indemnity previously paid". In light of the striking 
similarity between this provision and the doctrinal rhetoric in Tener, the 
Court's failure to recognize even the slightest conceptual co~ec t ion  
between Tener and Lapierre testifies to the hold that the legal structures 
of thought have over the collective judicial consciousness. 
Third, Chouinard J. said that Article 1057 could not be used to impose 
liability on the state since the Article did not establish an independent 
source of obligation. He did not explain why he took that view of the 
world. Nor did he recount why he rejected the final argument of the 
plaint8 - that a "theory of risk" could be used to justify an award of 
compensation. Lapierres' lawyers had uncovered several French 
administrative decisions of the late 1950's and early 1960's which had 
awarded compensation to those who had become immunization victims 
"as the result of efforts to protect the French public, in a pitiless game of 
chance".4* The French administrative courts had developed the theory of 
risk from Rousseauian notions of equality - demanding that individual 
sacrifice, even in the public interest, represents "a deliberate breach of the 
equality which should apply between citizens with respect to public 
burdens, and that equality must be re-established by means of a 
compensatory payment."49 Mr. Justice Chouinard simply chose to ignore 
that idea. 
4. A Matler for Negotiation 
The structure of legal taxonomy in Lapierre and Tener can best be 
explained by recognizing the intellectual constructs which the judges used 
(and were used by) to understand and categorize the social events which 
47. This is perhaps an example of the differences in common law and civil law language. Most 
lawyers socialized in common law culture will immediately recognize that the idea of 
extrapolation used by Lapierre's lawyers is a permissible, indeed a powerful, rhetorical device 
in common law language. Cases like Donoghue v. Stevenson. [I9321 A.C. 562 (H.L.) and 
LloydF h k  v. Bundy, [I9751 Q.B. 326 (C.A.) are famous not for their formal rules, but for 
their formal argumentative devices. This occurs in the case of maritime accidents, with the 
theory of expenditures in the common interest, as in the case of creditor's insolvency claims, 
and with the theory of reimbursement of necessary expenditures, as in the case of property 
improvements. 
48. R. Savatier, "Responsabilite de I'Etat dans les accidents de vaccination obligatoire 
reconnus imparables," Melange offerts a Marcel Waline, t.2 (Paris, 1974) at 752-3, translated 
at (1985), 16 D.L.R. (4th) 554 at 57475. 
49. Id at 575. 
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led to the two cases. Lapierre was a 'tort' case; a personal injury claim 
with no evidence of a deliberate bureaucratic sacrifice of Nathalie's 
welfare. Tener was a 'property' case; the devaluation of an economic 
resource with considerable evidence of a deliberate executive choice to 
sacrifice Tener's property. The way the judges constructed the different 
universes of Tener and Lapierre conditioned their whole response to the 
claims. Once the cases were identified and located in their doctrinal 
categories, all other considerations became irrelevant or, at best marginal. 
The operative legal structures were so ingrained that they became a 
matter of first-nature to them. 
The episodes in Tener and Lapierre are illustrative of how lawyers 
(and laypeople) treat the law's conceptual apparatus and discursive 
categories as natural and how, in the process, they confer the status of the 
real and concrete on the abstract and metaphorical. For instance, when 
deciding whether a contract exists between two parties, lawyers speak 
and act as if they were looking for a 'contractual thing' in a drawer full 
of social events and circumstances. It is assumed that, if all the facts were 
known, 'the contract' would somehow body forth and bring the dispute 
to a demonstrable close. Yet, as all law students know, a contract is an 
idea, not a thing; it is an abstraction. It exists in the realm of metaphysics, 
not in the world of physicality; a written contract is not the contract, but 
simply evidence of the contract. Similarly, property, does not comprise 
the tangible objects in the physical world, but the abstract relation 
between such visible effects and people.50 
Although born of historical expediency and sustained by political 
convenience, legal categories, like contract and property, take on a life of 
their own. Unlike the life of the so-called natural world, social activity 
responds to these conceptual metaphors and reproduces itself in 
accordance with them. Not only does this give the law a patina of 
plausibility and coherence, it allows lawyers to refer to 'reality' as 
confirmation of the naturalness and inevitability of prevailing legal 
structures and its underlying values. The fact that this process occurs 
unconsciously makes it no less political and much more effective. The 
judges have managed to construct and perpetuate a doctrinal schema that 
places property above persons. Whereas the notion of strict liability is 
standard in property, losses lie where they fall in tort unless there is a 
finding of fault. Through the vehicle of doctrinal principles and 
50. See Leff, "Contract as Thing" (1970), 19 Am U L Rev. 131 at 157 (property is "a sort 
of vector analysis with time coordinates [of a bundle of forcesp') and Hohfeld, "Some 
Fundamental Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning" (1913), 23 Yale LJ. 16 and 
(1917), 26 Yale LJ. 710. 
Heinonline - -  13 Dalhousie L.J. 39 1990 
40 The Dalhousie Law Journal 
classifications, values of the past are sustained in the present and judges 
are able to disclaim responsibility for this state of affairs. 
There are two major and related lessons to be learned from the judicial 
tandem of Tener and Lapierre - doctrinal indeterminacy and taxonomic 
malleability. Even once the situations were recognised as belonging to the 
tort and property categories, it is far from self-evident as to what the 
correct resolution should be as a matter of legal wisdom. As the varied 
judgments from the different levels of courts show, the doctrinal corpus 
is sufiiciently rich to sustain a range of equally plausible and perfectly 
contradictory outcomes. But, for the purposes of this paper, this 
phenomenon is not as important as the plasticity of the informing 
doctrinal categorie~.~' The conditions for entry into any doctrinal 
category are neither fixed nor certain; they are as open-ended and 
malleable as the doctrinal materials within the category itself. Events or 
categories can be redescribed and re-worked to contain what is presently 
considered irrelevant or incompatible. 
For instance, an immediate response to Nathalie's dilemma might be 
to retain the intellectually comfortable and existentially familiar 
structures and simply reclassify Nathalie's body as her property.52 Such a 
suggestion is hardly radical. John Locke is perhaps the best known of the 
"body as property" theorists, writing that "every Man has a Property in 
his own Person. Thus no Body has any Right to but himself".53 People 
have been treated as property in the past when it has served the purposes 
and interests of other dominant persons.54 Although less obviously crass, 
the law continues to follow a similar line today in some contexts.55 The 
inhumanity of treating persons as property can be rejected and 
resurrected in the reconceptualization of human rights as property rights. 
51. For an extensive development and explanation of doctrinal indeterminacy, see 
Hutchinson, "Democracy and Determinacy: An Essay on Legal Interpretation" (1989), 43 U. 
Minmi L Rev. 541. 
52. This idea was developed in a provocative essay in C.B. MacPherson, The Rke and Fall of 
Economic J&e and Other Papers. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). We 
recognize, of course, that some judges might reject the 'body as property' thesis. In Loge v. US. 
622 F.2d 1268 (1978), the Federal Court of Appeal rejected the argument in the case of a 
claim for compensation by a victim of a polio vaccination program. 
53. J. Locke, Second Treatise of Govemmenf Chapter 5 (1690) Locke, J., The Second 
Dentire of Governmerg 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966). See M.J. Sandel, Liberalism and 
the Limits of J&e (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982) at p. 116. 
54. The language in Bonne v. Eyre (1777), 1 H.BL. 273, 126 E.R. 160 (Court of Common 
Pleas) a pre-eminent 'contract' case, which speaks of the lawful possession of negros and of a 
negro being the property of the plaintiff, shows how comfortable ideas become to us. 
55. The Supreme Court itself in speaking of compensation awards in personal injury cases 
talks of "justice and humanity" and compensation for "a reduced capital asset" in the same 
breath. See Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 452 at 474-75 per 
Dickson J. (S.C.C.). 
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Property can be made to mean one's own person, capacities and life. 
Thus the choice to protect property from state action becomes a choice 
to preserve quality of life and not merely ownership of wealth and 
material objects. Individual property in "life, liberty and capacities" is 
more egalitarian than the more modem and limited notion of property, 
if only because everyone would have the same enforceable claims to their 
own selves. 
But the recategorization of well-being from rights through quality of 
life to property is merely a strategic calculation and simply effects 
instrumental restructuring of our thinking. Apart from perpetuating the 
dubious provenance of rights-talk, the recognition of the "whole prestige 
of property" works against the successful assertions of claims to human 
dignity and equality. Accordingly, within existing schemes, Nathalie 
Lapierre's protection would require a relabeling of her humanity as a 
property right. The worth of such a strategy is hopelessly transparent; the 
approach is facile and self-defeating. Shifting Nathalie's welfare into the 
'property room' of the taxonomic castle retains and actually strengthens 
the existing intellectual structure of legal discourse. Further, such 
manoeuvering can bring about only modest improvements in social 
welfare. Nathalie Lapierre can obtain compensation within the existing 
structure of law, but that would simply be to throw good money after 
bad. Reality has not changed, events have not changed, but our 
understanding and conceptualization of them has. So has the language we 
use to think about them. And that is all that matters. 
Thoughts about Nathalie Lapierre need not involve talk of human 
welfare as a property right in order to provide her with a better life. In 
comparing these ways of retelling Tener and Lapierre, it becomes 
apparent that judges, like everyone else, are captives of their own 
conscious and unconscious imaginings. The structure of law - the role 
of judges and representative institutions; the categorization of events as 
property, tort or contract cases; the classification of relationships as 
disputes; the application of 'external' sanctions' etc. - is allembracing. 
Yet the cynical recategorization of humanity as 'property' or the marginal 
restructuring of law to include 'rational' dialogue about the underlying 
values and instrumental effects of our choices do not exhaust the 
imaginative limits of the human condition. For instance, within legal 
doctrine, there is only the most attenuated discussion of communitarian 
values and the different choices they nurture. But it is exactly this kind of 
thinking that needs to be explored rather than suppressed - if only as a 
counterpoint to the fearful lack of vision in the status quo. 
What this article proposes is a recognition of structure - the existing 
ideas and language which are used to think about events like David 
Tener's economic well-being in British Columbia in 1973 and Nathalie 
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Lapierre's physical and emotional well-being in Quebec in 1972. Once 
the power of discursive assumptions and taxonomic classifications are 
more fully recognised, it might be possible to begin the essential project 
of beginning to talk differently. While some discursive commitment is 
necessary, no one particular structure is inevitable. There are other 
possible ways to think about and engage in the world. While the legal 
structures of the conceptual status quo are disciplining, we are not 
entirely disciplined; there exists some room for re-negotiation and re- 
constiuction. The remainder of the paper adumbrates some of the 
avenues that might be travelled in the journey toward an improved vision 
of the legal world. 
IV. Alternative A venues 
1. Government Liability or Community Responsibility 
The questions to be addressed in thinking about "government liability" 
for the welfare of individuals and groups in the community are these - 
To what extent, and through what institutional processes, ought the 
community to be responsible for the losses suffered by individuals and 
groups as a result of state action? How is the institutional competence of 
the courts or alternative dispute-resolution agencies to be assessed? 
Should responsibility be limited to entitlements to rights to compensation 
or should additional community responses be considered? Is the 
traditional judicial reluctance to impose positive obligations on private 
individuals (reflected in the misfeasance/nonfeasance dichotomy in tort 
law) appropriate in the case of governmental action and inaction 
liability? How is it to be decided if the state is responsible when it acts 
through relatively independent private and corporate agents? What is the 
appropriate response to the self-interested acts of public bureaucrats? 
When should the activities of decentralized government bodies expose 
public funds to liability? What aspects of human welfare should be 
protected from state action? Should compensation be limited to 
traditional property rights or ought the question to be approached 
unconstrained by private law considerations? What are the regulatory 
effects on public bureaucracies and private behaviour of alternative 
compensation regimes? What is the symbolic role of government 
immunity and governmental responsibility? What is the best use to be 
made of law's symbolism? 
Recent developments in tort law represent a critical shift in the 
development of public liability law. In particular, the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in City of Kamloops v. Nielsens6 acknowl- 
56. (1984), 10 D.L.R. (4th) 641 (S.C.C.). 
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edges explicitly that government liability for accidents and for deliberate 
distributive choices must be thought about in a significantly different 
manner than issues of private tort liability. It represents a deliberate 
decision by the courts that the regulatory activities of public institutions 
should be subject to review consisting of awards of compensation to 
adversely affected individuals. This development in tort law gives us 
some hope that the reactionary ideology reflected in Tener is not as 
pervasive as it might appear. 
A critical assessment of the current regime of government liability and 
the design of alternatives cannot avoid the intractable, highly contentious, 
and overtly political character of the exercise. It speaks to profound 
questions about the nature of democratic governance and resp~nsibility.~~ 
Furthermore, it is unnecessary to limit discussion to "public" tort 
remedies. Asking such large questions forces an appraisal of the role of 
the modem Canadian state and public bureaucrats. In short, there must 
be a willingness to tackle the fundamental problem suggested, but 
ignored in Tener and Lapierre. And we must ask the ultimate question, 
what is the responsibility of some members of the community to others? 
In the absence of a social consensus as to the responsibility of the 
Canadian community and the role of the state in defining that 
responsibility, there must be the same dialogue and resolutions in legal 
forums as is required in the political arena. Law must embrace rather 
than eschew ideology; the choice is only between candour and 
subterfuge. 
Tort law is one legal concept, along with promise (contract) and 
ownership (property), which can be used to define the scope of 
permissible conduct and to justlfy the imposition of obligations on private 
actors for the losses which their activities impose on others. It is extra- 
ordinarily broad in scope and encompasses, at least in theory, the entire 
range of human activities and interests. It is also the vehicle which has 
been chosen to impose liability on the state through the crown liability 
legislation. Accordingly, focusing on tort law in state liability cases signals 
the implicit adoption of a particular set of normative presuppositions. 
While it might be concluded that it is appropriate to apply private law 
concepts of tort to the state, beginning an enquiry with that assumption 
is very troublesome and likely dangerous. 
There are, of course, an infinite number of alternative liability regimes 
which might be considered in thinking about these questions and in 
particular, about how to respond to Tener and Lapierre. It is useful to 
keep in mind several of the more obvious choices. First, there is a "no 
57. Schuck, P., Suing Govenvnent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). 
Heinonline - -  13 Dalhousie L.J. 43 1990 
44 The Dalhousie Law Journal 
liability" regime under which no claims to compensation either against 
the state or against individual public bureaucrats would be recognized. 
This represents the political ideology of a totalitarian state - with no 
individual or group interests being respected under any circumstances in 
respect of the acts of a particular sub-group who can organize and 
mobilize force. The only constraint or response to state action in such a 
world would be an opposing source of violence. While it might constrain 
those who enjoy the legal authority to exercise force for the time being, 
it cannot realistically be conceived of as a compensation or regulatory 
system. 
Second, a "no liability" regime might be coupled with a comprehen- 
sive or limited compensation system. This could be funded out of.genera1 
revenues or through an insurance system which would necessarily 
include a specific fee generating process. For example, one response to 
individual welfare losses resulting from governmental or community 
action is legislation mandating compensation for vaccine injuries which 
exists in the United States and has been proposed in Canada.58 For 
example, it can be asked whether compensation rights which provide a 
patchwork of entitlements and are largely self-enforcing might be 
replaced by a comprehensive public compensation program; this would 
provide for the provision of services or money on the complainant's 
demonstration of a casual relationship between a private injury and 
government action. Such a definition, however, is far too simplistic. In 
designing such a program, it is necessary to decide which interests are 
compensable, define the amount of compensation, list the circumstances 
under which the "government action" criteria for compensation would 
be concede that determinations of causation would incorporate 
normative choice, and provide an institutional infra-structure for 
implementing and administering the compensation system. The basic 
58. See "Canada eyes compensation plan for vaccine injuries", The Medical Post December 
9,1986 at 39; McIntosh, "Liability and Compensation Aspects of Immunization Injury: A Call 
for Reform" (1980), 18 Osg. Hull LJ. 584; Reitze, "Federal Compensation for Vaccination 
Induced Injuries" (1986), 13 Bost. COIL Environ Afii L a w  Rev. 169. But even equating 
compensation only with financial reparation can often represent a choice to maintain the 
existing distribution of wealth and work to isolate the injured person from their community. 
See Hutchinson, supra note 5 at ch. 10. 
59. This would mean detining and distinguishing between action and inaction. This is an 
horrendously complex task. See Hutchinson and Petter, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The 
Liberal Lie of the Charter" (1988), 38 U. Tor. LJ. 278. As well, if one chose to limit 
compensation to cases of losses associated with government action, one would have had to 
justify the implicit, conse~ative/libertarian philosophy to preserve the status quo by 
predicating compensation on cases of state action making the complainant worse off than she 
was prior to the alleged wrong. 
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point, of course, is that the development of social welfare and insurance 
programs has made it impossible to think of liability regimes as a purely 
"private law" matter. 
A third possible way of thinking about Tener and Lapierre is to treat 
the state like a private firm where claims are made in tort, contract and 
property. This was the implicit model relied on by the Supreme Court in 
both these cases, and with limited exceptions, it represents the liability 
regime operating in Canada since 1953.60 Virtually every agency which 
has studied government liability has proposed that the Crown be treated 
"as nearly as possible" as a private individuaL61 It is also the favourite of 
conservative academics. Their Diceyian thinking is threefold: that public 
bureaucrats ought not to enjoy any special privileges and must be subject 
to the same law as private persons; that the civil compensation system 
should not recognize anything more than common law entitlements; and 
that unarticulated judicial values which inhere in private law concepts 
60. Of course, property claims were compensated prior to 1953 and restitutionary claims were 
recognized as well. Nonetheless, there was no general regime of liability applicable against the 
federal government prior to the enactment of the Crown Liabiliry Act. S.C. 1952-53, c. 30. 
There had, however, been several incremental attempts to expand the liability of the 
government in tort beginning with An Act Respecting m i a l  Arbitrators, S.C. 1886, c. 40, s. 
6, and ending in 1938 with an amendment to the Exchequer Court Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 34, 
s. 19(c). 
It is the model currently adopted in all provincial and federal crown liability legislation and 
in most English speaking countries after the Second World War. For example the American 
Federal Tori Cluims Act. 1947, provides that the federal government in the United States is 
liable for torts "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstancesn, incorporating the relevant state law applicable to the plaintitrs claim. In New 
Zealand, the Crown Proceedings Act. enacted in 1950 is modelled on the comparable English 
legislation of 1947. Both statutes impose vicarious liability on the Crown for the common law 
torts of civil servants. 
61. See Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, Report on Proceedings by and 
Against the Crown 13 (1975). The Law Reform Commission considered that an analysis and 
evaluation of each specific Crown privilege presented an insurmountable task, and thus 
proposed that: 
claims against the Crown [should be] as justiciable as claims against the subject, leaving 
it to the courts to resolve by judicial determination such particular ficulties as may 
occasionally arise from the fact that the role of the Crown may be special. 
The British Columbia Law Reform Commission made the identical recommendation 
several years earlier in its Report on Civil Rights, Part I, Legal Position of the Crown, (LRC 
9, 1972). The result was the enactment of the Crown Proceeding Act. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 86, 
section 2(c) of which provides that "the Crown is subject to all those liabilities to which it 
would be liable if it were a person". There have been no empirical studies in either jurisdiction 
which reveal the impact of such dramatic reforms. Recently, the New Zealand Public and 
Administrative Law Reform Committee in its Report on Damages in Adminbtrative Law 
(1980) recommended the enactment of a provision which would make the Crown "subject to 
all those liabilities in tort to which, if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it would 
be subject." 
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like 'reasonableness' are sufficiently flexible to permit them to be used in 
the context of public liability.62 
A fourth possibility would be a unified and comprehensive public 
liability regime which would be applied specifically to state actions and 
to state activities. This would differ in a number of respects from the 
liability regime applied to private f m . 6 3  Issues such as strict liability or 
fault, compensation for pain and suffering, excuses relating to statutory 
authority and the like could be grafted on to the system without 
replicating the detailed solutions amved at in the law of torts.64 While 
courts might be retained as the institutional mechanism to give effect to 
this substantive liability regime, they could also be replaced with an 
alternative review institution, like the ombudsman. 
Finally, and fifth, a government liability regime might consist of a 
melange of the previous proposals. This would demand an assessment of 
the range of claims to compensation made in connection with different 
regulatory activities, would involve the creation of a number of different 
liability, insurance or compensation systems which would be sensitive to 
the particular bureaucratic activity which generated the injury, would 
reflect a consideration of the private interests recognized in each case, 
would take into account the regulatory impact of the compensation/ 
liability regime on bureaucratic behaviour, and so on. 
2. Toward Communal Responsibility 
Any choice between and among these alternative regimes necessarily 
involves the development of a model of community action and 
responsibility. In determining. the possible liability of government to 
private individuals and firms, a number of normative assumptions central 
to an understanding of the concept of government liability can be 
identified. These norms permit an explanation and evaluation of 
"government liability". Only after completing that exercise will it be 
possible to understand how we should think about cases like Tener and 
62. See Bailey and Bowman, "The Policy/Operational Dichotomy - A Cuckoo in the Nest" 
(1986), 45 Camb. LJ. 430. 
63. This approach was rejected at least in part by the New Zealand Public and Administrative 
Law Reform Committee, supra, note 61. 
64. One idea of a public liability regime might be represented by the recognition of a general 
right of recovery of compensation for "unlawful" or "unauthorized" administrative action. 
However, concerns with the current conclusory analysis and manipulation of jurisdictional 
errors in administrative law, with an inability to distinguish between egregious and trivial 
errors, with the potential for judicial interference with bureaucratic discretion, and with the 
demonstrable plaintiff bias inherent in the recommendation, can easily be offered in support of 
rejecting such a proposal. See J. Evans, De Smith's "Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action" (3rd ed. 1983). 
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Lapieme that is appropriate to the prevailing institutional milieu and 
ideological climate in Canada. 
Such a project must commence from the understanding that law is 
inescapably normative; any liability regime comprises a public expression 
and embodiment of deepseated beliefs about communal ethics. A central 
and informing belief of our analysis is that the institutions of private law 
contain a set of normative and political ideas that are inimical to a 
humane and progressive response to human suffering and losses. The 
current liability regime reflected in Tener and Lapierre reflects a set of 
normative presuppositions which are not difficult to identify. It expresses 
the lingering values of a narrow political strategy that bears the imprint 
of late nineteenth century thinking in England. It is an ideology that has 
little relation to the pluralism which characterizes the modem Canadian 
state.'j5 As such, it becomes incumbent on any advocate of reform to 
articulate the values which inhere in or are aspired to by any particular 
society and, in light of those normative commitments, propose a scheme 
for communal assistance and care. 
The most disturbing characteristics of the liability regime reflected in 
Tener v. Lapieme are the retention of personal bureaucratic legal 
responsibility for common law torts, the imposition of vicarious liability 
on the Crown, and the denial, with few exceptions, of direct obligations 
by the Canadian community to its members. The choice of personal 
bureaucratic liability maximizes the deterrent effect of legal rules on the 
behaviour of bureaucrats and can be perceived as an expression of the 
political ideology of the Rule of Law. The retention of personal 
bureaucratic liability is a decision which denies public civil servants any 
immunities based simply on their status as public bureaucrats and creates 
incentives for bureaucratic conservatism.66 Moreover, using the common 
law of torts as the touchstone of liability means that only those interests 
protected by the judiciary in relations between private persons will be 
recognized in relations between individuals, the community and the state. 
The reliance on 'corrective justice' models of law-making, in defining 
relations between individuals, not only ignores the instrumental and 
65. See L. Panitch, The Canadian Slate: Political Economy and Political Power. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1977). Arthurs, H.W., "Wirhour the Law'? Adminirtra've Justice 
and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century Enghnd (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1985). 
66. Justification for their activity must be found in legislation and the interpretive rules used 
to articulate that justification are themselves based on anti-legislative biases. These include 
implied rights of compensation in the case of property rights, implied terms that state action 
will take place without negligence, and interpretive rules which preserve judicially defined 
common law entitlements unless expressly abrogated. See Cohen, D., Accident Compensation 
and the State, forthcoming Ch4. 
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social-ordering ideas commonly associated with legal decision-making, 
but also reflects a conservative ideology which denies the existence of the 
state or community in cases like Tener and hpierre. The idea of 
corrective justice asks only that it be determined whether a person has 
unlawfully caused an injury to another. If the answer to that question is 
in the affirmative, the injurer is required to restore the victim to the 
position she was in prior to the wrongful interference with her rights. 
Whatever merits corrective justice - the restoration of the status quo 
where the complainant demonstrates that the defendant has wrongfully 
interfered with her entitlements - has in defining and legitimizing 
private relations,6' it has only the most limited pertinence to state- 
individual relations. It presumes that the two parties are equal in all 
respects and that it is already known what entitlements ought to be 
recognized in the case of state action. In short, proponents of corrective 
justice beg the very question to be answered - what elements of human 
welfare ought to be protected?68 
Being inherently ahistorical and asocial in ib  construction and 
application, a model of corrective justice is ill-suited to the existence and 
commitments of the modem activist welfare state in Canada. Corrective 
justice ignores the legitimacy of collective action through public 
bureaucracies. To contend that the protection of individual rights always 
demands government liability is to maintain that government ought to be 
constrained from acting and that individual economic welfare as defined 
by judges must always prevail over the collective good. At the very least, 
any model of government liability must acknowledge and struggle with 
the inherent tension between individual rights and the collectivity. While 
a final resolution is unlikely, its continued presence transforms this 
acknowledgement and struggle into a fundamental matter. 
In contrast to such traditional models, very different values are 
expressed in alternative models of public compensation law. The idea of 
equal treatment has been recognized as a normative foundation of public 
liability in civilian jurisdictions. In France, for example, the Conseil 
d'Etat will order compensation from the government when one person 
has been forced to bear a disproportionate share of the costs associated 
with public activities. The English courts have also justified compensa- 
tion on equal treatment grounds, but the justification has been limited to 
"takings" of property. 
67. See A. Linden, C a d n  Tort Low 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988) at pp. 3-5. 
68. For an elaborate defence of 'corrective justice' see Weinrib, "Legal Formalism, On the 
Immanent Rationality of Law" (1988), 97 Yale Low Jouml949. 
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A different perspective points to the interaction of government liability 
and the modem redistributive state. Judges have, if somewhat belatedly, 
realized that in imposing liability on the state they are in effect 
(re)allocating public resources. Similarly, judges have attempted to 
exempt so-called 'policy' decisions from judicial review; this 
categorization has been justified in part on their self-confessed inability to 
develop legitimate grounds for the distribution of public resources in a 
different way than that originally chosen by elected officials and 
accountable b~reaucrats.~~ All responses to state action must recognize 
the political status of the defendant and the legitimacy of redistributive 
decisions which adversely affect the welfare of private citizens. While 
many, including judges, might disagree with the redistributive policies of 
any particular government, it is inconceivable that a "distributive 
judgement review tribunal" could be established which would have 
greater political legitimacy than the current representative institution. 
Any liability regime must defer to and complement, rather than subvert 
and stymie, the distributive policies and choices made by the democratic 
institutions of the state. 
A related normative idea in responding to state action is an 
appreciation of the development of communities and vehicles to ensure 
and facilitate sharing. One of the most powerful ideas describing social 
organization is that of the community as a form of social ordering 
through which its members can participate in sharing the losses 
experienced by others: people are interconnected and interdependent. We 
can exist as individuals, and achieve our potential as autonomous beings, 
only if there is a social community in which we participate. We live 
together in part because we can assist one another when we suffer losses 
as a result of events over which we have little or no control.70 It finds 
69. See Cleveland-Clzas Stemhips Co. and Cleveland-Cl@s Zmh Co. v. The Queen (1957), 
10 D.L.R. (2d) 673 at 679-80 (S.C.C.); Barratt v. Dkmmct of North Vancouver (l980), 114 
D.L.R. (3d) 577 (S.C.C.). This is one of the ideas reflected in Welbridge Holdings Ltd v. 
Metropolitan Corp of Greater Winnipeg, [1971] S.C.R. 957. Where the Supreme Court refused 
to impose liability for unauthorized legislative acts. Finally, this is the rationale for section 3(8) 
of the Federal Crown Liability Act which excludes from tort liability all bureaucratic activities 
carried out pursuant to statutory power or authority. However, the courts have interpreted this 
provision restrictively, stating that there is a presumption against statutory powers authorizing 
acts which would be tortious at common law. Only if the injury is an "inevitable" consequence 
of the exercise of statutory powers will the Crown escape liability. Similarly, section 6 of the 
Act suggests that the introduction of legislation will not give rise to liability. 
70. This notion of community and of individual responsibility for the welfare of others is 
recognized in Article 13 of the Declarution of the Rights of Man, 1789 which states that "For 
the maintenance of the forces of law and order and for the expenses of administration a general 
contribution is indispensable; it must be equally shared among citizens according to their 
means." 
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expression in decisions like Tener providing compensation when state 
action results in losses to property owners but not, apparently in cases like 
Lapierre when public health measures result in injury to children as a 
necessary consequence of immunization programmes. The community 
benefits as a result of the individual's sacrifice and egalitarian ideals 
suggest that the loss should be shared equally. 
. All of these ideas can be expressed under the rubric of compensation 
rather than deterrence or justice as the fundamental value underlying an 
appropriate response to cases like Tener and Lapierre. Most tort theorists 
recognize the role of compensation, regulatory deterrence7' and 
corrective justice72 in private tort law. Yet notions of regulatory 
deterrence and corrective justice are not simply transposed to "public" 
liability. The unique political, economic, and bureaucratic characteristics 
of the state suggest that thinking about government liability requires a 
more sensitive and sophisticated approach to the nature of the state. The 
ineffectiveness of tort law as a regulatory instrument and the prevailing 
ideals of social justice compel the selection of compensation as the 
primary object of a "liability regime" which responds to the injury- 
causing behaviour of public institutions. 
It is commonly argued that "the notion of comparative utility suggests 
that the aggregate utility of a group of individuals may be increased by 
taking a small amount of goods and services from all individuals to 
compensate an injured individuaY.73 This is one element in reducing the 
consequences of losses which occur in society; the consequences of 
accidents which do occur can be reduced through loss shifting 
arrangements.T4 In this model, compensation represents a mechanism 
whereby collective groups can 'bribe' victims of collective action. In these 
circumstances, the role of the state is to minimize the transaction costs 
71. This is the model which finds expression in the law and economics literature, "One of the 
main purposes of law, from an economic standpoint, is the control of externalities . . . 
[Lgbility rules . . . are devices by which people are given incentives to internalize the costs and 
benefits of their actions so that an efficient allocation of resour& is achieved". Posner, "Some 
Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law" (1979), 46 U. Chi L Rev. 28 1 at 305. 
72. This is the traditional view which still holds in the minds of most Canadian judges, 
academics and lawyers. The law of torts is seen as a study in corrective justice - an effort to 
articulate a coherent, internally consistent set of rules and principles to decide whether a 
particular plaintiff has a right to recover compensation from a particular defendant. Issues of 
public policy and regulation are, at best, subsumed in the rules. See C. Gregory, H. Kalven and 
R. Epstein, Cases and  mate^ on Tom xxii, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977) and 
Weinrib, "Toward a Moral Thwry of Negligence Law" (1983), 2 L of Law & Phil 37. 
73. See Spitzer, "An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort" (1977), 50 S. CaL 
L Rev. 515 at 520. 
74. G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents; a Legal and Economic Analysis. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1970). 
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otherwise associated with organizing the collective group and, also, to 
prevent free-rider problems. 
The strongest arguments in favour of compensation on these grounds 
can be made in the context of state-individual relations. Compensating 
one individual by ordering another individual to pay him or her a sum of 
money is simply injuring the latter to benefit the former. There is no a 
priori reason to believe that the injured is better than the payer or that the 
injured's utility associated with the money is greater than the payer's. 
Even if there were, serious doubts must' be harboured as to the ability to 
achieve any consensus among people whose social rankings are not 
consistent; that is, it is difficult to engage in interpersonal comparisons of 
utility when only compensation is being assessed and when questions of 
the past and future behaviour of the injured and of the payor as well, 
which might justify the loss-shifting, are excluded from inquiry. State- 
individual relations, however, can be analyzed on quite different terms. 
First, it is feasible to anthropormophize a community which consists of 
large numbers of individuals and hypothesize that it will be less risk- 
averse than the potential victim of its activities. If that is so, welfare gains 
are generated by shifting the risk of injury from the potential individual 
victim to the community. Second, if the losses represented by the 
compensation are internalized by the state, they will be borne by all 
private individuals who stood to gain fiom the deployment of those 
resources in their next best bureaucratic use. The disappointed potential 
beneficiaries will be impossible to identify as they will very likely not 
know that they are victims. Also the forgone opportunity of benefiting 
from state action is likely to be perceived to be less significant than the 
actual loss suffered by the victim. Third, in the case of state-individual 
relations, the potential beneficiaries who are victimized by the loss- 
shifting will often outnumber the victims. In such circumstances, the 
secondary cost avoidance advantages of loss-spreading, will be present. If 
the losses are externalized over time, the welfare gains associated with the 
loss-spreading will increase.75 Loss-spreading rationales, of course, have 
enormous implications when the defendant is the community and the 
loss-spreading mechanism is either taxation or increases in the money 
~upply.7~ Fourthly, compensation arguments also draw on the idea of 
75. Of course, those gains will be offset by an increase in the magnitude of loss perceived by 
the "insurers" who will pay out a portion of their existing wealth, rather than simply fail to 
receive some unknowable portion of state largesse. 
76. While loss-spreading may not be a rationale for the development of tort law, there is little 
doubt that the reallocation of losses over large numbers and over time is a significant 
consequence of the implementation of tort law. See A. Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 4th ed. 
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1988). The available evidence suggests that the federal government 
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"fairness as equality". Many Continental writers in thinking about state 
responsibility begin their analyses with Article 13 of the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man as the origin of the French administrative concept of 
"equality before public charges". That concept is reflected in the current 
Quebec Civil Code and was offered as justification for compensation in 
Lapierre.77 The interpretive rule has been justified on the ground that the 
burden of public action ought to be borne by the community rather than 
imposed on a particular victim. In a sense, the concept can be understood 
as a reflection of expost equal protection - that state action should not 
arbitrarily discriminate among members of the public. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, in thinking about distributional 
equity and loss-spreading, two related ideas must be kept in mind. The 
first idea is that the class of injuries to be redistributed must be identified. 
Will redistribution include losses associated only with property 
ownership, with personal liberty, with personal bodily integrity, with 
economic wealth, with psychological well-being, and so on? The second 
idea is that the groups of people to whom the losses will be shifted must 
be determined - that is, distribution of losses across the community 
must take into account the particular fiscal or taxation policies that the 
state employs as its loss-spreading mechanism.78 Identification of the 
particular injuries and groups will require a wide-ranging debate of a 
political rather than technical content and character. 
The design and evaluation of public liability regimes can only be 
undertaken after there has been a full airing of ideas about a variety of 
issues - the legitimacy of public bureaucracies, wealth redistribution, the 
role and meaning of community, equal treatment, utilitarianism, loss- 
shifting, corrective justice and so on. Only after some agreement about 
does not procure market insurance in respect of contingent tort liability, nor are associated 
costs passed on to the community through increases in product prices, with concomitant 
reductions in product usage. Whatever the incentive effects of legal risks might be in the private 
sector, they are unlikely to operate in the same fashion in the case of public institutions. 
77. It also underlies some decisions of English judges who have created interpretive rules 
protecting a limited class of property owners from the redistributive judgments of the legislative 
branch of government. See Attorney General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd, [I9201 A.C. 508 
at 542. (H.L.(E.)) However, such judicial intervention is largely conservative in nature and 
runs foul of the usual objections. 
78. During the nineteenth century, the recognition of property and contract claims was 
coupled with taxation policies which taxed the wealth of property owners and of the 
commercial classes through excise and sales taxes. Thus, if judges had chosen to recognize non- 
property and noneonomic interests they would have implicitly been shifting wealth to a 
broad range of potential victims from a relatively narrow range of taxpayers. Stated implicity 
in Risk, R.C.B., "Lawyers, Courts and The Rise of the Regulatory State" (1984), 8 Dalhousie 
LJ. 31. See also Pery, Harvey, T a r e  Tanfls and Subsidies. (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1955) a factual and descriptive study of taxation and tiscal policy in Canada. 
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how those ideas are combined to comprise the Canadian body politic, 
can there be a serious evaluation of the current liability regime and the 
best scheme with which to replace it. Such a project demands not only 
a sophisticated intellectual apparatus, but a solid grounding in practical 
details. It is a daunting, ambitious, but vital undertaking. 
V. Conclusion 
It should be understood that the criticisms made of Tener and Lapierre 
are not simply criticisms of particular judges or judgments. The critique 
is intended to cut much deeper and touch on the whole legal way of 
thinking about the world and ourselves. Law does not simply serve 
society, it defines and helps to constitute that society and its members: 
law is one of the discursive practices, institutional structures and 
intellectual media for organising and acting in the world. There is nothing 
beyond, above or below interpretation, but more interpretation. The 
belief in a possible rendezvous with an ultimate reality, unmediated by 
discourse, is mistaken. It is a romantic conceit, a dangerous deceit and, 
for many, a disabling crutch. It is too simplistic to presume that lawyers 
stand outside the world and can understand, evaluate and control the 
world without being part of it. By being in the world, they are front-line 
combatants, whether they like it or not, in the political struggle to resist, 
reproduce or change that world. Rightness is not about correspondence 
with an external world nor a solipsistic harmony with our own 
prejudices. It is to be found in the historical and reflective negotiation 
between the two. 
However, we are not condemned either to idolize the existing 
discursive practices in their literalness or to engage in a demoralizing 
solipsism. Lawyers must take responsibility for the world as it and for its 
discursive and taxonomic supports. Insofar as these structures and 
categories have been made, they can be re-made. But first, there must be 
a greater understanding and appreciation of how they were made, why 
they were made that way and how they function. While we can never be 
outside the world's abstractions, we can "smash the semantic box in 
which our current thinking is locked . . . [and] craft a better cabinet out 
of materials really available in a real world."79 Such knowledge is a form 
of empowerment in itselt it gives perspective and purchase on the 
'fabricatedness' and 'non-naturalness' of present arrangements. Social 
justice can be realized through and in the process of world-(re)making. 
The accent of truth must be detached and emancipated from the 
79. Leff, "Contract as Thing" (1970), 19 A m  U. L. Rev 131 at 157. 
Heinonline - -  13 Dalhousie L.J. 53 1990 
54 The Dalhousie Law Journal 
particular social, economic and cultural relations that comprise the status 
quo. Accordingly, the theoretical enterprise must undergo a radical re- 
orientation. Philosophy (of law) becomes not a task of refined 
description, but a project of engaged construction; (legal) hermeneutics 
will replace epistemol~gy.~~ The theorist will not seek to pin down 
foundational truths, but will strive to open up the essential dialogue of 
world-making. 
One place to begin would be to become aware of our existing 
structures and lives - to recognize the intellectual constructs and 
language of contracts, torts, and property. We are all prisoners of our 
white lines on the freeway. It is true that we cannot navigate our lives 
without some lines to follow; they tell us what we have come from and 
what we are going to. Nonetheless, we must not forget that, in some 
profound sense, we have not only painted those white lines, but we have 
built the freeways as well. In our small legal world, we can begin to 
rethink our categories, our cumculum, and our pedagogical techniques. 
We must become receptive to a dialogue which replaces the perceived 
reality of contracts, torts, property, and the like. Instead of reinforcing the 
illusion of one reality, courts must open up the law to different voices and 
realities; it must become "a medium through which particular people can 
engage in the continuous work of making justice."*l That recognition and 
achievement can take place incrementally. Perhaps that is all we can 
hope for or want. 
A story has a beginning, a middle, and an end, Aristotle said, and nobody 
has proved him wrong yet; and that which has no beginning and no end 
but is all middle is neither story nor history. What is it, then?8* 
80. See Hutchinson, 'The Three 'Rs': Reading/Rorty/Radidy9' (1989), 103 Harv. L Rev. 
555. 
8 1. Minow, "Foreword: Justice Engendered" (1  987), 10 1 Ham L Rev. 10 at 95. 
82. Ursula K. Le Guin, Always Coming Home. (New York: Harper & Row, 1985) at p.63. 
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